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Special recognition for the development of this statement must 
be accorded the task force that was formed to review the social 
security retirement system. The task force was chaired by James 
E. Wheeler, CPA, and its members included Donald H. Skadden, 
CPA, and B. Kenneth Sanden, CPA.
Introduction
In its fullest sense, “social security” should be viewed as a 
comprehensive, lifetime system composed of interrelated parts.
In one way or another, society must protect itself from financial 
disasters. It needs and wants financial protection from serious 
health problems, debilitating poverty, and loss of income due to 
unemployment, disability, or death of the family breadwinner; and 
it wishes to provide for retirement income.
Such a total protection plan should be financed by some com­
bination of governmental programs, employer programs, private 
savings, and insurance plans. In the United States a significant 
portion of this total protection is provided by employer- and in­
dividually-financed insurance and savings plans. In addition, the 
federal, state, and local governments spend billions of dollars an­
nually on social protection programs, including (1) welfare (includ­
ing aid to dependent children (ADC), food-stamps, low-cost public 
housing, supplemental security income (SSI, a guaranteed annual 
income plan for low-income persons that is financed by general 
revenues), and many other federal and state welfare programs), 
(2) unemployment compensation, (3) disability protection, 
(4) medicaid and medicare, (5) survivorship protection, and 
(6) retirement benefits.1
This statement of tax policy is concerned primarily with the 
retirement portion of the Federal Insurance Contribution Act 
(FICA; hereafter, the social security system).
1. For perhaps the most complete discussion of the many facets of our social 
security system, see Robert J. Myers, Social Security (Homewood, Ill.: Richard 
D. Irwin for McCohan Foundation, 1975).
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Summary of Recommendations
The recommendations of most observers, including the current 
administration and Congress, concentrate primarily on the revenue 
side of the system and call for constant increases in the payroll tax. 
These taxes have already grown faster than the consumer price 
index, increasing by more than 840 percent between 1962 and 
1981 (as projected). Even with these increases, revenues for 1981 
and later will almost certainly be inadequate to support the pro­
jected level of outlays. Consequently, unless Congress mandates 
new sources of revenue or further increases in social security taxes, 
projected benefits must be reduced. Because payroll taxes cannot 
continue to rise at this rate, our recommendations focus on the 
benefits taxpayers should receive from the system.
If adopted, these suggestions would prevent long-term oper­
ating deficits for the retirement portion of the social security system 
and would allow for some reduction in social security taxes. In 
addition, these suggestions would significantly simplify the system 
and make it more equitable.
Briefly, the recommendations are as follows:
1. The present stratified benefit computation should be replaced 
by an unstratified payment schedule based on each individual’s 
price-level-adjusted total contributions to the retirement sys­
tem. An individual’s total contributions would include the re­
tirement portion of both employee and employer contributions, 
plus a real rate of return. That sum would in turn be adjusted 
for price-level changes. This amount would be the basis for the 
earned retirement benefit. In order to receive the same re­
tirement annuities, self-employed persons should contribute 
an amount equal to the total amount contributed by both the 
employee and the employer.
This earned computation system would eliminate 
•  The minimum benefit computation, and thus the problem 
of “double dipping. ”
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•  The weighting of benefits or a disproportionate return on 
different contribution amounts.
These items presently result in retirement benefits in excess 
of the amounts that would be received on the basis of price- 
level-adjusted total contributions to the system; thus, they in 
effect constitute welfare-type payments.
2. The current pay-as-we-go concept should be retained. There 
is no need to create a large, actuarially sound fund with which 
to meet obligations; however, the absence of an actuarial in­
vestment fund means, in essence, that the government’s gen­
eral fund has “borrowed” from the social security fund. Some 
subsequent transfers from the general fund to the social se­
curity fund are necessary to pay back these borrowed amounts. 
The timing of such repayments would be influenced by any or 
all of the following phenomena:
•  The inclusion of a price-level adjustment in the benefit 
calculation.
•  The inclusion of a real rate of return in the benefit calculation.
•  Dramatic decreases in the ratio of workers to retirees due 
either to high unemployment or to significant demographic 
changes.
3. As indicated in the foregoing recommendations, total contri­
butions used in calculating retirement benefits should be ad­
justed periodically to reflect increases in the consumer price 
index. This periodic updating for price-level changes would 
ensure the relatively constant purchasing power of the benefit 
received.
4. The retirement annuity should begin at age 65, unless actu­
arially reduced benefits beginning at some earlier age have 
been elected, regardless of the participant’s employment sta­
tus. If early retirement is permitted, the initial annuity should 
be based on contributions up to that retirement date. Wages 
after early retirement should be subject to FICA until age 65, 
thus requiring an annual recomputation of the retirement 
annuity.
Discontinuing the taxation of earnings after age 65 would 
eliminate all inequities in the present rules concerning work 
after that age. Many persons have difficulty explaining why 
individuals who need additional income should be penalized
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(subjected to FICA taxation and loss of social security benefits) 
for working, whereas persons with large amounts of investment 
income (and thus large equity interests) collect full social se­
curity benefits.
5. Settlement options selected at the time of retirement should 
permit (1) a joint and survivor annuity (for married persons), 
(2) a single-life annuity, or (3) an annuity with a guaranteed 
refund feature under which the price-level-adjusted total re­
tirement contributions would be guaranteed to either the re­
tiree or the estate. If the participant dies before reaching age 
65 without a surviving spouse, the total price-level-adjusted 
contributions for retirement should be paid to the estate. If 
there is a surviving spouse, that person generally should have 
the same settlement options that the participant would have 
had on reaching retirement age.
This recommendation would eliminate much of the ineq­
uity arising under the present system (1) when persons are 
taxed and die before retirement age without having eligible 
dependents and (2) when one spouse dies after both have con­
tributed to the system during working years.
6. For income tax purposes, the retirement portion of the FICA 
tax assessed against employees and self-employed persons 
should be deductible when it is paid, and retirement benefits 
should be taxable when they are received. The employer’s 
contribution should continue to be deductible. Because lump­
sum distributions (the result either of death before retirement 
age or of the guaranteed refund feature) would be subject to 
income tax, Congress should consider some form of income 
averaging.
7. The foregoing recommendations would increase future social 
security retirement benefits for some and decrease them for 
others. If any retirees’ incomes should drop below established 
minimums, then those persons should be eligible for income 
assistance under the supplemental security income (SSI) pro­
gram, which is financed by general revenues and is based on 
need. For present and near-term retirees, the current level of 
scheduled benefits should perhaps be guaranteed without tests 
of need, but the excess of the amounts that they receive over 
the amounts that they would collect under the earned com­
putation plan should come from the SSI program.
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8. Coverage under social security should be made as universal as 
possible.
9. If Congress desires to retain the present income tax exclusion 
for social security benefits, an exclusion that does not benefit 
low-income retirees, then the exclusion should be legislatively 
enacted. An exclusion of this magnitude should not be made 
by administrative decision only.
The major thrust of these recommendations is that welfare, the 
actuarially unearned portion of the benefits from the social security 
system, should be transferred to the general revenue budget. 
Welfare should be an expenditure out of general revenue, not 
payroll tax revenue. This would greatly strengthen the social se­
curity system and would simplify its structure. The regressive na­
ture of the payroll tax would then be justified, for it would be 
paying only for earned retirement benefits.
The shift of welfare payments from the social security program 
should permit a significant reduction in social security taxes; how­
ever, the need for general revenue (primarily from the income tax) 
would increase. The tax reduction for social security should exceed 
the needed additional income tax revenue because of the imple­
mentation of the need test under the SSI program. The entire 
social security tax reduction should result in reduced labor costs 
and increased economic activity, which could help reduce unem­
ployment and infl ation and increase capital formation.
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Questions and Answers
Much of the study leading to these recommendations involved 
attempts to answer five basic questions.
1. Is the social security system absolutely necessary?
With about 34.4 million current beneficiaries and with 
about 110 million others expecting benefits because of their 
current tax payments (in 1978), there can be little doubt that 
a federal retirement system is absolutely essential.
2. Is the social security tax regressive?
The financing of social security is highly regressive to mod­
erately low- and middle-income wage earners because the tax 
is a flat rate based only on a limited amount of earned income. 
For very low wage earners in 1980 ($6,527.41 or less) with 
dependent children, the refundable earned income credit off­
sets the full impact of the FICA tax.2 Thus, for this group, the 
effective tax rate is zero and, therefore, not regressive. For 
wage earners between $6,527 and $10,000 with dependent 
children, the earned income credit offsets a declining portion 
of the social security tax; above $10,000 the credit does not 
offset any of the tax.
Congress offers an ability-to-pay concept as the rationale 
for the “exclusion” of low wage earners ($6,527 and below) with 
dependent children from social security taxes.3 This concept, 
however, is not applied consistently, since persons who have 
high incomes solely from investments are also “excluded” from 
the tax.
For persons with large salaries, the effective social security 
tax rate decreases as earned income increases. Thus, this tax 
is progressive for some very low income wage earners, but it 
is normally quite regressive when compared to the tax on the 
earnings of an average wage earner.
2. .0665X =  500 -  .125(X-6,000). X =  $6,527.41.
3. U.S., Congress, Senate, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, S. Rep. 1236, pp. 51-52.
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If one views the social security contribution as the purchase 
of a retirement plan, then regression should be inevitable, 
since regression is the natural result when low-income persons 
purchase anything, be it food or a retirement plan. Observers 
should realize the regressive nature of the expenditure but 
should not criticize the retirement system because of it. To the 
extent that the social security tax finances any government 
activity other than the individual’s own retirement, it should 
be acknowledged to be regressive; but to the extent that an 
individual’s social security contribution is limited to the amount 
necessary to finance his own retirement, the concept of re­
gressivity is irrelevant.
3. Are the retirement benefits of the social security system 
progressive?
Yes, they are very progressive, especially for those who 
obtain the so-called minimum benefit or who have had very 
low earned incomes. For persons who have had all of their 
FICA tax refunded through the earned income credit, the effect 
is more than progressive; they receive heavily weighted ben­
efits based, in part, on wages that were essentially untaxed.
Progression of benefits is one of the things that is wrong 
with the system. Retirement benefits should be based on what 
a person has paid into the system. To the extent that a bene­
ficiary receives more than what has been paid for, he is re­
ceiving welfare; and welfare payments should not be funded 
with a regressive payroll tax. Regressive payroll taxes favor the 
upper-income groups, and progressive welfare benefits favor 
the low-income groups, with middle-income wage earners and 
self-employed persons supplying the benefits.
4. What percentage of an individual’s retirement income should 
social security provide?
The retirement benefits should be whatever amount has 
been “paid for” by prior tax payments, but the amount should 
not be so large that it eliminates the need for private savings. 
The exact percentage of necessary retirement income that 
should be supplied by social security is difficult to determine; 
it should, however, provide a floor of protection for those with 
normal working lifetimes and average wages.
5. Should general tax revenues be used to supplement the social 
security system?
7
If the system actually were a retirement system, as most 
people have been led to believe, the answer would be a re­
sounding No. General revenue should not be used to supple­
ment retirement system revenues; however, our present social 
security system includes a substantial element of welfare that 
should be removed entirely from the social security system and 
shifted to the supplemental security income (SSI) program, 
which is purely a welfare program funded through general 
revenues.
Under our present system, it seems logical that general 
funds should be transferred to the social security fund for at 
least three reasons, two of which are related to the welfare 
element discussed above. First, the benefits are relatively 
higher for those at the lower end of the income scale. The 
practical effect of this is that two major groups draw benefits 
substantially in excess of what their contributions would justify: 
(1) those who actually earned at the lower levels through most 
or all of their working lifetimes and (2) government employees 
who are able to take private-sector jobs just long enough to 
qualify for social security benefits at the low-income levels. 
Both groups are receiving something that they have not paid 
for, which, in essence, is welfare. This welfare element should 
be subjected to a need test and should be financed by general 
revenue funds, not by the regressive payroll tax.
Second, much of the recent short-run deficit in the system 
is due to heavy unemployment, and this affects intergenera­
tional transfers under the pay-as-we-go system. The effects of 
excessive unemployment should not result in increased tax 
rates in the retirement portion of the social security system. 
When this happens, the labor sector is hit twice—once by 
unemployment and then by increased social security taxes.
Again, it would be preferable to make the social security 
system truly a retirement system. In this case, an unemployed 
worker who did not contribute to social security would not 
receive credit for the period of unemployment. If a worker 
suffered such severe unemployment that his earned retirement 
benefits fell below some minimum standard, he would be el­
igible for a welfare payment that would come from general 
funds. Alternatively, if unemployed workers were given credit 
for their periods of unemployment, then the general fund 
should, in essence, make their contributions for them during
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the period of unemployment. It would be possible to establish 
a normal rate of contributions for unemployed persons. It 
would also be possible to designate a reasonable rate of un­
employment, in which case the general fund would need to 
make contributions to the social security fund only during pe­
riods of excessive or prolonged unemployment.
Third, because social security taxes paid by individuals are 
not deductible, the income taxes paid on the employees’ and 
self-employed persons’ social security contributions are a form 
of double taxation. Thus, in a very real sense, the social security 
system is contributing to the general fund substantial amounts 
that should be made available to the system itself The amount 
of such double taxation is very difficult to measure. The earned 
income credit is a direct offset to the double taxation, but, even 
beyond that, it is quite difficult to know to what degree Con­
gress modified income tax rates because of the rapid increase 
in social security taxes.
A much better alternative would be for the social security 
system to be taxed in the same way as qualified pension plans. 
This would require taxation of social security benefits and de­
ductibility of social security taxes. Because of the impact of the 
zero bracket amount and the double personal exemptions after 
age 65, taxability of benefits would not reduce the income of 
any individual whose only income after retirement comes from 
social security benefits.
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Problems Requiring Further 
Research
No benefit percentage is specified in our recommendations. 
Instead, we state that benefits should relate to price-level-adjusted 
total contributions. This would require, in effect, a breakdown of 
the contributions in order to determine how much would be for 
retirement and survivorship as opposed to disability. This would 
be an extensive actuarial undertaking and could perhaps be done 
best by the social security administration. The appendix shows 
several examples of the computation of price-level-adjusted total 
contributions.
Logically, social security retirement benefits should reduce an 
individual’s desire for personal savings, and both of these—social 
security benefits and personal savings—should have an impact on 
the need for welfare such as SSI. The benefits from social security 
should be high enough to be attractive to groups of federal, state, 
and local employees and yet not so large that they eliminate the 
need for personal savings, including private retirement plans. This, 
too, is a function of the amount of the contribution. Thus, if the 
welfare aspects of the present social security system were shifted 
to the SSI program, perhaps the payroll tax rate could be signifi­
cantly reduced. This should increase personal savings and thus 
stimulate capital formation.
In addition, in certain situations, capital can be substituted for 
labor; with social security taxes increasing faster than the cost of 
living, the effect on employment is detrimental. An inability to 
substitute capital for labor may be particularly onerous to certain 
sectors of the economy, such as nonprofit entities, including state 
and local governments.
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A Review of the System
The remainder of this statement of tax policy reviews some of 
the basic characteristics of the retirement portion of social security, 
analyzes some of the financing problems confronting the system, 
and develops some recommendations for change.
The present social security system affects most Americans at 
some point in their lifetimes.
The number of persons receiving monthly benefits under the OASDI 
[old-age, survivors, and disability insurance] program totaled 34.4 
million at [the end of] September 1978. An estimated 110 million 
workers had earnings in calendar year 1978 that were taxable and 
creditable toward [their] benefits under the program.4
In addition to the millions of workers, several million employers 
also paid social security taxes. The figures in the foregoing quotation 
indicate that there are currently about three workers for each ben­
eficiary receiving old-age, survivor, or disability benefits. Accord­
ing to some estimates, by the year 2050 this ratio may decrease 
to a point where the number of retirees could approach the number 
of covered workers. In 1976 the chief actuary of the U.S. Social 
Security Administration commented as follows:
Since 1962 social security taxes have increased faster than the con­
sumer price index (CPI) and most recommendations for change call 
for increased taxes. Under the current-cost method of financing, the 
amount of taxes collected each year is intended to be approximately 
equal to the benefits and administrative expenses paid during the 
year plus a small additional amount to maintain the trust funds at an 
appropriate contingency reserve level. The purpose of the trust funds
4. Board of Trustees, 1979 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal 
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Balti­
more: Social Security Administration, U.S.D.H.E.W ., 1979), p. 4.
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under current-cost financing is to reflect all financial transactions and 
to absorb temporary differences between income and expenditures.5
The desired size of the contingency reserve was recently re­
duced from approximately 100 percent of the annual expenditures 
to 50 percent, and one Carter administration proposal would have 
reduced the desired reserve to about 35 percent of one year’s 
expenditures, based on the added protection of their recommended 
countercyclical device.6 The actual fund balance in 1980 is far below 
the desired 50 percent reserve.
In recent years, the social security system has grown enor­
mously. In the projected 1981 federal budget, the revenue gen­
erated by social security taxes (FICA, medicare, and unemploy­
ment) is more than two-and-a-half times the revenue from the 
corporate income tax and represents almost one-third of total fed­
eral receipts.7 For millions of Americans, social security taxes are 
significantly larger than individual income taxes.8 A comparison 
between the 1962 federal budget and the projected federal budget 
for 1981 shows that social security tax receipts have increased more 
than 840 percent.
Even with all of this revenue, the system is currently paying 
monthly benefits in excess of monthly revenues and will likely 
continue to do so even with the huge increases in the FICA tax. 
The 1977 amendments to the social security system, representing 
one of the largest tax increases ever imposed, were supposed to 
supply enough revenue to make the system sound until the turn 
of the century; but with inflation and high unemployment, the 
system is still drawing down the fund balance.
5. A. Haeworth Robertson, A Commentary Prepared to Assist in the Reading 
and Interpretation of the 1976 Trustees Report, OASDI, and A Commentary 
Prepared to Assist in the Reading and Interpretation of the 1977 Annual Reports 
of the Board of Trustees of the Social Security Trust Funds (Baltimore: Social 
Security Administration, U.S.D.H.E.W ., 1976 and 1977), p. 1 of both documents.
6. “Statement of HEW Secretary Califano on the Administration’s Social Security 
Financing Proposal Before the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Social Security,” 
as reported in the B. N. A. Daily Report for Executives (June 13, 1977), p. X-2.
7. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, The Budget of the United States Gov­
ernment Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1980), p. 39.
8. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Special Analyses Budget of the United 
States Government Fiscal Year 1980 (Washington, D .C .: U.S. Government Print­
ing Office, 1980), p. 48.
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The Social Security old-age trust fund is in financial peril once again, 
and despite the scheduled boosts in the Social Security tax rate, the 
government will have to come up with an additional $15-$25 billion 
in revenues over the next few years to keep the fund solvent through 
1984.9
In 1966, by contrast, the social security system receipts were 
less than the tax yield from the corporate income tax, and the 
system was operating with revenues in excess of benefits.
Obviously, total benefits have increased even faster than the 
rise in social security taxes, even though the increase in the FICA 
taxes has greatly exceeded the increase in the CPI.
From 1937 through calendar year 1976, cumulative income to the 
trust funds amounted to $661 billion . . . and cumulative disburse­
ments amounted to $620 billion. The balance of $41 billion was held 
in the trust funds at the end of calendar year 1976. Based on current 
projections (under the intermediate assumptions) it is estimated that, 
during the calendar years 1977-81, income to the trust funds will 
total $499 billion . . . and disbursements will be $540 billion. This 
is a projected decrease in the trust funds of $41 billion during the 
period 1977-81.10
With all this change, there had to be some adjustments made; but, 
unfortunately, the answer was another tax increase in the Social 
Security Amendments of 1977.
The Basic Retirement Package
In its narrowest sense, social security is security for retirement, 
even though this is only one part of our old age, survivor, disability, 
and health insurance (OASDHI) system. A mandatory, contribu­
tory retirement system is not only desirable, it is essential, because 
we cannot back out and start anew. Without such a system, millions 
of additional low-income elderly persons would be on public wel­
fare; for the same reason, it is absolutely necessary that benefits 
not be eroded by inflation.
9. B. N. A. Daily Report fo r Executives (January 21, 1980), p. LL-1.
10. Robertson, Commentary to the 1977 Annual Reports of the Social Security 
Trust Funds, p. 2.
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Concepts in Financing the Retirement Package
The American public generally has been convinced that this 
universal retirement plan should be paid for by the payroll tax. 
According to this view, payroll tax payments are somewhat similar 
to retirement annuity premiums. Indeed, most persons probably 
see this tax as their investment in their own future retirement 
benefits; the current acceptance of our very high payroll tax may 
well be attributable to the predominance of this view.
Alternatively, the payroll tax can be viewed as just another 
source of federal revenue—a flat-rate income tax based solely on 
a limited amount of earned income. As just one more source of 
federal tax revenue, there would be no need for prior designations 
of how these funds should be spent. Certainly, in this view, there 
is no need to tie benefits to contributions or even to have separate 
funds. The idea of using general income tax revenue to supplement 
the payroll tax would not exist because both would be considered 
to be sources of general revenue. For example, under this concept, 
welfare, defense, or any other payments could be met with the use 
of payroll tax revenues. This would remove from social security 
any pretense of retirement insurance and would convert the entire 
social security system to simply another form of welfare.
It is worthwhile to note that our present retirement system is 
really a combination of both concepts, even though they are quite 
different. To the extent that the payroll tax is used to augment 
general revenues (through hidden welfare expenditures), the 
American public is being deceived. In addition, there may be very 
serious economic implications.
Characteristics of Retirement Under the Social Security 
Plan
The principal characteristics of the federal retirement system 
are (1) it is compulsory, (2) it establishes a floor of protection (a 
social adequacy concept), (3) it is self-supporting via the payroll 
tax, and (4) it is not a means- or need-tested program. There are 
some significant exceptions to all of these concepts.
The Compulsory Coverage Concept
The single most important exception to the compulsory con­
tribution concept is the exclusion of federal (and in some cases
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state and local) employees. There is a separate retirement plan for 
federal employees (similar in some respects to private retirement 
plans), but this is not an adequate reason for the exclusion of 
government employees.
It has been observed that in 1969 one-third of social security bene­
ficiaries who were also receiving benefits under another governmen­
tal plan were receiving minimum benefits.
In fact, it appears to us that there is no valid reason for the exclu­
sion, and, therefore, all governmental employees should be 
brought into the system. This has implications for both the mini­
mum payment and the weighting of benefits, which are discussed 
later.
Social security coverage is generally compulsory only if the 
individual has wage or self-employment income. Investment in­
come, such as dividends or interest, is not taxed to provide for 
social security . When a retirement system does not pay any welfare, 
this tax exemption is logical because investment income continues 
after retirement (unless the principal is consumed), whereas wages 
are generally discontinued.
The Social Adequacy (Floor-of-Protection) Concept
Many people believe that society should guarantee every in­
dividual a minimum level of health care and a minimum standard 
of living. To one degree or another, such a welfare concept is well 
ingrained in the political and social structure of the United States 
today.
Social adequacy is a welfare objective in which an individual’s benefit 
amount is determined, not by his or her contributions, but by
(a) appropriate transfer of income from affluent to needy groups, and
(b) a minimum standard of living beneath which society decides that 
no individual should fall. The Social Security Act of 1935 represented 
a compromise between equity and social adequacy within a system 
that was designed to build at least a part of the actuarial reserve that 
would be necessary to fund a comparable privately oriented program. 
But amendments to the Act steadily shifted the emphasis more in
11. Myers, Social Security, p. 189.
12. Report of the Consultant Panel on Social Security to the Congressional Re­
search Service, joint committee print (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1976), p. 24.
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the direction of social adequacy by weakening the relationship be­
tween benefits and contributions. [Emphasis added]13
It is not necessary, nor is it logical, that this minimum “social 
adequacy” be provided entirely through the social security retire­
ment system. There are a number of ways in which individuals 
may provide for their own retirement, including employer pension 
plans, Keogh plans, individual retirement accounts, private an­
nuities, individual savings accounts, and social security. Most peo­
ple have viewed social security from the beginning as a means by 
which they are providing for their own retirement; indeed, the 
government has taken great pains to promote that notion. If we 
do not return to a logical and fiscally responsible relationship be­
tween contributions and benefits, the entire social security retire­
ment system will lose its credibility. If an individual retiree’s re­
tirement income from social security and other plans, if any, is 
inadequate, then the income can be supplemented by the variety 
of local, state, and federal programs mentioned earlier.
Presently we are attempting to provide a major part of the 
minimum social adequacy through the social security retirement 
system, via a benefit structure that greatly overweights the benefits 
at the low end of the scale. The minimum monthly benefit, which 
had increased more rapidly than other social security benefits, has 
been frozen at $122 since January 1979.14 To be eligible for the 
minimum benefit, an individual must have had one quarter of 
covered employment for each year after 1950 that he or she was 
between the ages of 21 and 62. Thus, an individual retiring in 1981 
at the age of 62 would need 30 quarters of coverage (lesser of 1980 
minus 1950 or ages 61 minus 21); workers retiring in 1991 or later 
will need only 40 quarters of coverage.15 Thus, if a worker retires 
after having earned $260 per quarter (which was the minimum for 
one quarter of coverage in 1979; for years prior to 1979 this min­
13. Report of the Consultant Panel on Social Security, p. 12. It should be noted 
that the income transfer is not from the affluent but largely from the middle- 
income wage earner.
14. Controller General of the United States, Minimum Social Security Benefit: 
A Windfall That Should Be Eliminated (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Ac­
counting Office), pp. 1-3.
15. Ibid, p. 2. There is a transitional guarantee for those persons retiring between 
1979 and 1983: They can use the new or the old formula to maximize their social 
security benefits.
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imum was $50 per quarter) for 40 quarters, and if the FICA tax 
rate were .0665 (the 1981 rate) in each quarter, the FICA tax 
withheld would total $691.60 ($260 x 40 x .0665) for the ten-year 
period. For this amount, this person would be receiving a monthly 
minimum benefit of $122, or $1,464 each year of retirement.
Attempting to provide minimum social adequacy through the 
social security retirement system creates various social and financial 
problems. When welfare is provided through retirement pay­
ments, it is not practical to subject it to any sort of need test. The 
absence of a means test for the welfare element of social security 
causes disproportionately high benefits to be paid to many indi­
viduals who have substantial incomes from other sources. Also, it 
makes it possible, and often financially attractive, for government 
employees to accept covered employment just long enough to qual­
ify for the minimum social security benefits.
One of the greatest inequities of combining welfare with social 
security is that this portion of federal welfare must be financed 
entirely by workers covered by social security, whereas welfare 
should be financed from the general revenues. The financial impact 
of combining welfare and social security is evidenced by Professor 
Wilbur J. Cohen’s testimony that benefits received but not paid 
for by the beneficiaries when they were contributors “approximates 
about one-third of the long-range costs."16
Thus, we strongly recommend that there be no “minimum 
benefit” from the social security retirement system, but that all 
benefits be based directly on the individual’s own contributions 
to the system and length of employment. If such benefits, plus 
retirement income from other sources, are below whatever mini­
mum society establishes, the additional benefits should be pro­
vided from a general fund welfare program.
Professor Cohen suggested another alternative that would treat 
the benefits received from federal, state, or local public retirement 
or pension plans, which are supplementary to social security, as 
being from social security. Thus, persons covered by such plans 
would receive the higher of the two (if only two) plans but not both 
(unless they were fully and continuously covered under both 
plans).17 This would be an improvement in the present system
16. Wilbur J. Cohen, former HEW Secretary, in testimony before the Senate 
Finance Subcommittee on Social Security, as reported in the B.N.A. Daily Report 
for Executives (June 16, 1977), p. J-4.
17. Cohen, B.N.A. Daily Report for Executives (June 16, 1977), p. J-3.
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relative to government workers; however, we believe that our plan 
corrects many other defects and is, therefore, preferable.
The Self-Supporting Concept
Many persons seek to keep the social security system and the 
general revenue system separate. Robert J. Myers, testifying as 
a former chief actuary, on February 4, 1976, stated the following:
Finally, let me turn to how the financing problems of the OASDI 
system should not be solved. Some people have proposed the solution 
of injecting a governmental subsidy from general revenues into 
OASDI either directly or else indirectly by moving some of the 
Hospital Insurance tax rates to OASDI and then injecting a govern­
ment subsidy into HI. This approach should not be followed for a 
number of reasons.
Introduction of a government subsidy would dilute the awareness 
of the public as to the cost of the program, because many would 
believe that somebody other than themselves would be providing 
this financing.
In actual fact, the general revenues taxation necessary to produce 
the government subsidy would be paid by virtually the same people 
who are now paying the payroll taxes—and very likely with not too 
great a difference in the actual incidence of the taxes. [Note: Even 
if this latter assumption were true, it totally ignores the economic 
and political implications.]
The injection of general revenues into the time-tested approach 
to the system being wholly self-supporting from payroll taxes would 
erode the self-sustaining concept by moving in the direction of a 
welfare concept. In turn, this could lead to means testing for benefits. 
Any general revenue financing in OASDI would very likely lead to 
a lack of stability in the benefit protection provided because of the 
pressures of other programs that can only be financed from general 
revenues.18
The injection of general revenues into the social security system 
has a counterpart that is almost never mentioned—the inclusion 
of general fund expenditures (welfare) in social security benefits. 
To be consistent, we must oppose the use of social security system 
revenues to finance general revenue expenditures (in the form of 
welfare) as strongly as we oppose the use of general revenues to
18. Robert J. Myers, Statement on Behalf of the American Life Insurance As­
sociation on the President’s Social Security Proposals Before the Subcommittee 
on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means, February 4, 
1976, pp. 3-4.
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finance the social security system. Welfare programs are rightly 
expenditures of general revenues, not payroll taxes. Thus, welfare 
expenditures should be removed from the social security system 
or paid for by using general revenues within the social security 
system. We favor the former.
The social security system is termed “self-supporting,” a con­
cept for which there are at least three possible interpretations. At 
one extreme would be an actuarially sound, fully funded program 
comparable to a commercial annuity. This might be thought of as 
self-supporting with respect to each separate annuitant. The fund­
ing feature of this program is not necessary, feasible, or even de­
sirable for social security: Full funding of social security would 
completely upset the entire economy. At the other extreme, the 
entire social security system is said to be self-supporting for any 
year in which sufficient payroll taxes are collected to cover that 
year’s payments to retirees. A third concept, which combines cer­
tain features of each of the others, would require that each indi­
vidual’s benefits be actuarially based on his contributions and years 
of service but would not require the funding, which, in essence, 
means that current contributions would still be available for pay­
ment of part or all of current benefits.
The social security system was really conceived under the third 
concept, since the system’s designers expected a fairly direct cor­
relation between an individual’s retirement benefits and the 
amounts of that individual’s contributions. The idea was sold to the 
public on that basis, and the government has carefully maintained 
this notion of “insurance.” One of the greatest advantages of an 
actuarial correlation between contributions and benefits is the dis­
cipline it would place on Congress in considering benefit increases. 
Unfortunately, Congress has moved our social security system al­
most entirely away from this actuarial relationship, even while it 
was publicly nurturing the idea that the system is still a federal 
insurance program. Without actuarial discipline, Congress has 
elected to incorporate an ever increasing share of the federal wel­
fare program into the social security retirement system.
There are two important aspects relative to the self-supporting 
concept. First, an actuarial relationship between contributions and 
benefits would not preclude the use of general revenue funds for 
the payment of retirement benefits. In fact, the absence of the 
funding, which would be a part of a commercial system, would 
require the use of general revenue funds. In essence, the general
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revenue funds would provide the interest factor that would be 
necessary to produce the actuarially computed benefits because, 
in a very real sense, the government has “borrowed” all of the 
retirement contributions. The government would need to invest 
the contributions in order to produce actuarial benefits, and, there­
fore, general revenues should pay the interest on such borrowing. 
It is important to note, however, that the system would use an 
actuarially determined amount of general revenue, and this would 
in no way destroy or even damage the concept of the retirement 
system as an insurance program.
Secondly, Congress apparently intends the present social se­
curity retirement system to be self-sustaining as a system, without 
the use of general revenue funding. The fact is that income taxes 
and social security contributions have been so intermingled on 
both the revenue and expenditure sides that today it is almost 
impossible to determine whether the retirement system is even 
self-supporting as a system. Even ignoring for the moment the 
well-publicized shortfall in social security revenues, the self- 
supporting nature of social security is probably more fiction than 
fact. This policy statement has emphasized that the social security 
fund contributes to the general fund by financing a major share of 
the federal welfare program. Also, there are both explicit and im­
plicit transfers from the social security fund to the general fund 
through the general fund’s borrowing activities. The present trust 
fund balance is invested in government bonds, which, during pe­
riods of rising interest rates, pay substantially below a reasonable 
market rate of interest. Also, as was pointed out earlier, there is 
an implicit benefit to the general fund in that there is no attempt 
to provide an actuarial funding of social security contributions.
There is a substantial further implicit transfer of funds from the 
social security system to the general fund in that the employee’s 
contributions to the retirement system are not deductible for fed­
eral income tax purposes. Thus, for every dollar contributed to the 
social security system, the worker is also paying income tax to the 
general fund at his highest marginal income tax rate. This double 
taxation of contributions is usually excused on the basis that benefits 
are not taxable. The double taxation of contributions, however, is 
either not offset at all or is offset in a very inequitable fashion by 
the exclusion of social security benefits from income taxation. Due 
to the zero bracket amount and personal exemptions, the exclusion 
is meaningless for anyone whose entire retirement income is from
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social security. Anyone who dies before retirement will have suf­
fered the double taxation of contributions but obviously will receive 
no benefit from the exclusion. Millions of individuals suffer the 
double taxation of benefits at a relatively high marginal rate for 
thirty or forty years but enjoy the exclusion at a much lower rate 
for a much shorter period of time. In addition to these inequities, 
the time value of money indicates that the cost of double taxation 
is considerably greater than the much later exclusion benefit.
Benefits also flow in the other direction from the general fund 
to the social security system. The refundable earned income credit 
was enacted in order to reduce the burden of the FICA tax for the 
very-low-wage earners. Thus, workers with dependent children 
and incomes below $10,000 contribute to the social security system 
but receive a partial or full offset against their income taxes.
It should be obvious that the two systems (general revenue 
and social security) have not been kept separate. In fact, the 1978 
income tax reductions were justified in part as necessary to at least 
partially offset the burden of the increases in social security taxes. 
Adjusting one system because of changes in the other intertwines 
the two systems and severely damages a true self-supporting 
concept.
The Means-Test Concept
A means test may be applied either at the time contributions 
are made or at the time benefits are received, although a pure 
retirement system would not need the application of a means test 
at either stage. The social security retirement system has a form 
of means test at both the contribution and benefit stages.
Perhaps the best example of a hidden means test, at the point 
of contribution, is contained in the $500 refundable earned income 
credit, as amended in 1978.19 While credit is given on the income 
tax return, its justification was to relieve low-wage earners with 
dependent children of some of the heavy burden of the FICA tax. 
If a person had a steady $5,000 salary each year, and if there were 
no increases in real wages during the individual’s working years, 
the “average indexed monthly wage” would be $416.67. In the 
absence of an indexing factor (explained later), this would produce 
a retirement benefit of $237.73, giving this person an income re­
placement ratio of 57.05 percent ($237.73 $416.67). It should
19. I.R.C. sec. 43.
21
be noted that for 1981 the $500 maximum credit exceeds the 
$332.50 FICA tax on $5,000 (6.65% x $5,000) by $167.50; thus, 
an individual with only $5,000 in annual wage income is, in effect, 
relieved of the entire employee FICA tax plus $167.50 of income 
tax and still retains all of the heavily weighted benefits for low- 
income wage earners. The aggregate effect is that no tax has been 
paid; thus there can be no earned retirement benefits, only welfare. 
This may be most desirable for low-income wage earners, but it 
should be recognized that their social security benefits are welfare, 
funded by a payroll tax on other workers, not a paid-for retirement 
package.
As discussed elsewhere in this study, on the benefits side there 
is a very real means test applied through the variable replacement 
ratio, which gives heavily weighted benefits to lower-income 
workers.
The Benefit Structure
In articles and congressional testimony, many persons have 
restricted most of their recommendations to the revenue side of 
the system. With the tremendous growth in revenues, however, 
it appears that most of the system’s problems really involve the 
benefit side. Benefits have increased faster than revenues, even 
though revenues have risen faster than the CPI.
Before presenting benefit structure recommendations for 
changing the retirement system, we shall review both the pre-1979 
and the post-1978 computation schemes and the effects of signif­
icant amendments in 1972.
The Pre-1979 Benefit Formula
Except when the minimum benefit rules apply, retirement 
benefits are based on the computation of an average monthly tax­
able wage. For years prior to 1979, this usually covered only the 
nineteen highest years of taxable wages earned since 1951. (Starting 
in 1979, the number of years included increase each year.) Once 
the average monthly taxable wage for years prior to 1979 was de­
termined, it was stratified into seven predetermined layers, to 
which specified benefit percentages were then applied in calcu­
lating the primary insurance amount (PIA). The benefit percent­
ages, as of June 1977, varied from 145.90 percent on the lowest 
stratum to 24.34 percent on the highest. The percentages, how-
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ever, did not decrease uniformly, as one might have expected them 
to do. In fact, they varied somewhat irrationally, with the rate 
declining through the first three strata and then increasing for the 
fourth layer, followed by decreases through the subsequent strata. 
In addition, the layers or strata of the average monthly taxable 
wage were not equal; they varied in an irregular pattern from $290 
to $100. This is demonstrated in the table below, where the average 
benefit percentage is 46.42 percent ($638.28 ÷  $1,375).
Practically speaking, it was not possible for an individual in 
1977 to receive the indicated maximum benefit of $638.28. As
Effective Benefit Table as of June 1977
Strata of Average
Average Monthly 
Benefit or Primary
Monthly Taxable Wage Percent* Insurance Amount***
First $ 110 145.90 $160.49
Second 290 53.06 153.87
Third 150 49.58 74.37
Fourth 100 58.30 58.30
Fifth 100 32.42 32.42
Sixth 250 27.02 67.55
Seventh 375** 24.34 91.28
Total $ 1,375 $638.28
x 12
Total taxable
wages in 
1977 $16,500
*Each percentage increased 5.9 percent over the previous year, when the highest percentage 
was 137.77 and the lowest percentage was 22.98.
**Increased $100 over the previous year. When this $100 is multiplied by twelve months, 
it equals the $1,200 increase in taxable wages, or the increase from $15,300 for 1976 to 
$16,500 for 1977. For 1978 this amount increased to $17,700.
***T h e 1977 benefit formula was selected so that the effects of the automatic increases in 
both the monthly taxable wage base and the percentage figure could be reflected.
Note: The increases in benefit percentages (based on CPI) and in taxable wages (based on 
increases in average wages) are the results of the 1972 amendments and result in a double 
adjustment for inflation for current workers.
Source: U.S., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administra­
tion, Social Security Bulletin—Annual Statistical Supplement, 1974, p. 19, and U.S., Con­
gress, Senate, Committee on Finance, Staff Data and Materials Relating to Social Security 
Financing, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, p. 5.
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shown above, that maximum would require an average taxable 
wage of $16,500 per year, and, for all years prior to 1977, the 
maximum taxable amount was less than $16,500. Thus, no indi­
vidual retiring in 1977 had an average monthly taxable wage equal­
ling $1,375. On an average monthly taxable wage of $687.50 (one- 
half of the maximum), the benefit would be $459.19 ($110 x  
145.90% +  $290 X 53.06% +  $150 X 49.58% +  $100 x  58.3% 
+  $37.50 X 32.42%). If an average monthly taxable wage of the 
full $1,375 were possible, the second $687.50 of wages would have 
generated an additional benefit of only $179.09 [($100 — $37.50) 
X 32.42% +  $250 x  27.02% +  $375 x  24.34%] or $638.28 -  
$459.19. This is about 39 percent of the benefit generated by the 
first half of taxable wages.
Significant 1972 Amendments
Two important changes were made in the benefit structure in 
1972. Under the first, benefits are adjusted automatically for in­
creases of 3 percent or more in the CPI. This was the cause of the 
5.9 percent increase in the benefit percentage noted in the table. 
For 1979 the increase was 9.9 percent, and for 1980 the increase 
is for 14.3 percent. Under the second change, there is an automatic 
increase in the maximum taxable wage (to the nearest $300 mul­
tiple) as average taxable wages rise (based on taxable wages of the 
first quarters of the two prior years). This automatic increase is also 
reflected in the table as an increase in the maximum taxable wage 
base fr om $15,300 to $16,500 ($17,700 as of January 1, 1978).
While automatic adjustments due to changes in the CPI are 
desirable, the dual benefit was not justified for many current work­
ers. Wages rise in response to inflation, and as taxable wages in­
crease, the related future social security benefits also expand. 
Then, when the benefit percentages also increased in response to 
the CPI, there was a dual benefit. This was discussed thoroughly 
by many persons, and suggestions were made for uncoupling this 
unintended dual benefit.20 James B. Cardwell stated
The trustees note that about half of the long-term financing deficit
can be eliminated by correcting the overindexing of benefits that
20. See Colin D. Campbell, Over-Indexed Benefits—The Decoupling Proposals 
fo r Social Security, and Robert S. Kaplan, Financial Crises in the Social Security
24
arises from the 1972 legislation creating automatic cost-of-living in­
creases. The overindexing has the long-range effect of raising social 
security benefits to levels at which they would replace a far greater 
percentage of a worker’s final earnings than they now do. In some 
cases, future benefits would even exceed pre-retirement earnings.
Decoupling or stabilization of replacement ratios was a significant 
part of the Social Security Amendments of 1977.
The Post-1978 Benefit Formula
Starting January 1, 1979, the seven-strata formula was replaced 
by one using only three strata. For 1979 these strata were sched­
uled as follows:23
Averaged Indexed 
Monthly Earnings
Benefit
Percentage
First $180 90
Next 905 32
Excess over 1,085 15
Thus, the new three-strata formula removed the illogical increase 
in the benefit percentage in the fourth stratum of the pre-1979 
formula, and it also reduced the benefit percentage for the first 
stratum to below 100 percent (permanently for current workers 
and temporarily for retirees). The new structure, with initial benefit 
percentages ranging from 90 percent down to 15 percent, does 
nothing to improve the logical actuarial relationship between total 
contributions and benefits received.
System. Both are 1976 Domestic Affairs Studies of the American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. See also 1976 Annual 
Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 
and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, p. 118; and Reports of the Advisory Coun­
cil on Social Security, as reprinted in the B.N.A. Daily Report for Executives 
Special Supplement (March 7, 1975), pp. 8-10.
21. “Briefing Notes for James B. Cardwell, Commissioner of Social Security” 
(Press briefing May 24, 1976, on reports of the trustees of the social security trust 
funds), B.N.A. no. 101 (May 24, 1976), p. X-1.
22. For an analysis of the 1977 changes, see Colin D. Campbell, The 1977 
Amendments to the Social Security Act (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978).
23. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-216, sec. 201(a).
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The new formula is largely a response to the need for decou­
pling. Benefits are now based on average indexed monthly earn­
ings. To be indexed, each prior year’s taxable wage is multiplied 
by the ratio of the average covered wages of all workers for “the 
year” (two years before the worker reached age 62) to the average 
covered wages of all workers in the year being indexed. For ex­
ample, if the average covered wages were $6,000 in 1960 and 
$18,000 two years before the retiring worker reached age 62, and 
if he had covered wages of $5,000 in 1960 (the year being indexed), 
the $5,000 would be increased to $15,000 for purposes of calculating 
the average indexed monthly earnings. Thus, as wages rise each 
year, the average indexed monthly earnings for each past year will 
also rise. (This increases future benefits but does not increase the 
amount contributed.)
In addition, as covered wages rise, the amounts in the three 
strata will also increase. For example, if covered wages increase 
10 percent, the three strata for the following year would be in­
creased by 10 percent. This was done so that persons would not 
be pushed into higher strata, where the benefit percentages are 
lower.
Thus, the strata can change annually for current workers while 
the benefit percentages remain unchanged. The average indexed 
monthly earnings for retired workers will already have been de­
termined and will not change, but their benefit percentages will 
increase, as under the 1972 amendments, in response to increases 
in the CPI. The separate treatment of current workers and retired 
workers resulted from the elimination of the double indexing error 
in the 1972 amendments.
In addition to these changes, the maximum taxable wage is 
scheduled to increase from $17,700 in 1978 to $29,700 in 1981. 
Also, the combined employer and employee rate is scheduled to 
increase from 12.1 percent in 1978 to 13.3 percent in 1981. The 
combined maximum tax payment will increase from $2,142 to 
$3,950. This is an 84.4 percent increase in the maximum tax pay­
ment in this three-year period.
The large increase in taxable wage base means increases in 
future benefits, which probably will result in less private savings. 
The increased benefits, when combined with the expected de­
creases in the worker-to-retiree ratio, will also cause the system 
to operate in a deficit position at the turn of the century; but this 
increase in tax revenue was expected to keep the system solvent
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until then. Unfortunately, with higher-than-anticipated inflation 
and unemployment, the social security retirement system appar­
ently needs another $25 billion between 1980 and 1984.24 Thus, 
this huge tax increase will not get the system through 1984, let 
alone through the turn of the century.
Changing Birth Rates and Unemployment
Even with the enacted form of decoupling, there are still long- 
run problems in funding of social security benefits due to changing 
demographics. This is based on assumptions of continued low birth 
rates, which will not be completely offset by such other factors as 
more women entering the work force, increased numbers of im­
migrants, later retirements, and so forth. Regardless of the relative 
size of the birth rates in different decades, it is unjust to force one 
generation, because they happen to have been born in a period 
of declining birth rates, to pay more for their ultimate retirement 
than preceding or succeeding generations. If our primary recom­
mendation were adopted and benefits were based actuarially on 
contributions, this would not present a problem. If such an actuarial 
relationship is not established, however, we recommend that any 
time the ratio of employed-to-retired falls below a fixed level— 
perhaps three workers for each retired person—general fund rev­
enues should be used to make up the shortfall.
Unearned benefits, inflation, changing birth rates, and un­
employment have been principal causes of the gloomy predictions 
for social security. Therefore, we also recommend use of general 
revenues to replace the FICA taxes (less reduced benefits) lost due 
to excessive unemployment. High unemployment levels provide 
no justification for increases in payroll taxes; it seems only fair that 
under the current system the loss of social security funds due to 
excessive unemployment, say something above 5 percent to 6 per­
cent, be made up out of general revenue.
The short-term problem is caused by combined inflation and un­
employment. Since social security benefits are, by law, tied to the 
Consumer Price Index, the relatively high rates of inflation of the 
past two years have caused higher expenditures for social security 
benefits than can be supported by the present tax structure, while
24. B.N.A. Daily Report fo r Executives (January 21, 1980), p. LL-1.
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the high levels of unemployment have meant less income to the trust 
funds through the payroll tax.25
Potential Impact on Employment
It has long been assumed that only individuals pay taxes. In 
other words, all corporate taxes are ultimately borne by individual 
investors, suppliers, consumers, or workers. There is no reason to 
believe that the employer portion of the social security tax is dif­
ferent. When a corporation incurs this cost, it is passed on to 
someone. Both the employee’s gross wages (which include the 
employees’ share of the FICA tax) and the employer’s share of 
FICA are included in the employer’s cost of doing business. Both 
are included in the total labor cost and, if the employer is a taxable 
entity, are deductible for federal income tax purposes. Thus, if the 
employer is a taxable entity, a portion of any FICA tax increase 
may be passed on to the government through the tax deduction, 
but the remainder must be recovered from customers through 
price increases or compensated for by reduced payments to other 
parties, such as the stockholders, suppliers, or workers themselves. 
If the employer is a nonprofit entity, the entire FICA tax must be 
passed on, or levels of operation must be reduced.
This increased cost of labor may normally result in higher wage 
demands and prices, as well as increased unemployment. In our 
current economic situation, the government should avoid any ad­
ditional FICA tax that would tend to spur both unemployment and 
inflation. In fact, a reduction in such a tax in stagflation periods 
would be highly desirable.
Where business sets prices by a fixed percentage mark-up over costs, 
a rise in payroll taxes will raise the prices of goods and services in 
the short run because employers will view such tax increases as 
increases in their labor costs. Increases in payroll taxes may, there­
fore, contribute to inflation. In addition, since the rise in prices 
reduces consumer real income, total consumer demand will decline 
in real terms and this will reduce production and employment. There­
fore, rising payroll taxes may be one source of stagflation, as the 
simultaneous presence of inflation and high unemployment has come 
to be called.
25. “Briefing Notes for James B. Cardwell,” p. 2. This statement was made in 
1976, before even more severe increases in inflation and unemployment hit the 
system; thus, it is even more true in 1980.
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Computer simulation studies conducted by the staff  compared 
the eff ect of a rise in employer payroll taxes with an equal increase 
in the personal income tax. The simulations showed that the payroll 
tax, if shifted forward, reduced employment by twice as much as an 
equivalent increase in the personal income tax. Moreover, the payroll 
tax increase raises the rate of inflation in the short run, whereas the 
income tax increase tends to lower it.26
In the manufacturing sector, there is necessarily a balance 
between the cost of equipment and the cost of labor. While it is 
absolutely necessary to have capital to employ labor in our econ­
omy, it is possible to replace labor with equipment. This substi­
tution of one for the other should be made whenever the after-tax 
cost of one is lower than that of the other.
There are other areas in our economy, however, that are highly 
labor intensive, where substitution of equipment is not really fea­
sible; examples include professional firms of attorneys and CPAs 
and also nonprofit organizations, such as state and local govern­
mental units, hospitals, and universities. The last group, univer­
sities, has had great difficulty in coping with inflation, and as a 
consequence, their employees’ real wages have been decreasing. 
In addition, for any increase in the FICA tax there must be an 
equal increase in revenues just to break even, since there is no 
income tax benefit from a deduction of the employer’s half of the 
FICA tax or from the expected increases in employee wages. Thus, 
any increase in social security taxes to meet rising welfare costs 
within the social security system is extremely detrimental to the 
entire covered nonprofit sector of our economy. It should also be 
noted that the use of an income tax credit to reduce employers’ 
social security costs (one of the Carter administration proposals) 
does nothing for the nonprofit sector unless it is a totally refundable 
credit.
As stated before, welfare obligations should not be financed 
with a regressive payroll tax; welfare is an obligation for general 
revenue sources. While we should not put general revenues into 
the social security system, we should likewise not put general fund 
obligations into that system. But this is exactly what we are doing— 
paying for welfare with a regressive tax on labor—and its impli-
26. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Budget, Economic Recovery and 
Financing of Social Insurance, committee print (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov­
ernment Printing Office, 1977), pp. 5-6.
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cations for the well-being of most of our not-for-profit institutions, 
state and local governments, and, generally, labor-intensive in­
dustries may be very serious.
The Use of General Revenues in the Social Security 
Retirement System
If the system we have outlined had always been in existence, 
it would seldom need any assistance from the general revenue 
fund; there would exist a significant fund from which to pay re­
tirement obligations. The system should be self-supporting except 
when certain extraneous factors affect either benefits or financing.
1. Because these funds are loaned to general revenue and because 
of the pay-as-we-go system of intergenerational transfers, the 
payroll tax fund could become insufficient whenever a high 
level of unemployment exists for an extended period of time. 
In this case, it is recommended that general fund revenues be 
used to supplement or, in other words, to make up the shortfall 
in current payroll tax revenue. In fact, this could be viewed 
not as tapping general revenues but, instead, as the general 
fund repayment of borrowed payroll tax revenues if the ben­
eficiaries’ payments were based on their contributions.
2. Again, due to the intergenerational transfer system, demo­
graphic changes can cause a shortfall in current payroll tax 
revenues. Thus, it is recommended that if the ratio of workers 
to retired persons falls below a fixed point, for example three- 
to-one, that the shortfall in payroll tax revenue be made up 
from general revenues.
3. Our recommendations would require the general fund to reim­
burse the payroll retirement fund for the real rate of return 
plus the inflation factor. Since price-level-adjusted total con­
tributions require an inflation adjustment plus a real rate of 
return, this amount should be charged to the general fund for 
its use of these funds even when the Treasury could borrow 
at a lesser rate. The appendix contains some examples of our 
suggested computation of the price-level-adjusted total 
contribution.
Any major reform of the social security system should include 
a re-examination of at least two other characteristics of the present 
arrangement. From the very inception of social security, contri­
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butions have been extracted only from earned income. This was 
justified on the assumption that investment income would continue 
after retirement. This justification has limited validity. One of the 
fundamental concepts of social security has been a forced savings 
program under which individuals are expected to provide at least 
a basic floor of protection for themselves. This would be better 
fulfilled if all income contributed to such “forced savings.” Thus, 
if society determines that a certain floor of retirement income, 
disability protection, survivorship benefits, and health care is es­
sential for every individual, persons with only investment income, 
as well as workers, should provide that floor of protection for them­
selves. Also, wage earners with some investment income might be 
expected to save part of their total income. To the extent that 
investment income does continue through periods of disability or 
into retirement, it would simply supplement the basic floor of 
protection.
Another characteristic of the present system, the benefit re­
ductions due to income earned after retirement, has been subjected 
to vigorous criticism within Congress and elsewhere. Many people 
consider it strange and highly inequitable that retirees who desire 
to supplement their social security pensions with part-time em­
ployment find those pensions reduced or eliminated when em­
ployment income reaches a fairly modest level. For this earned 
income to reduce retirement benefits and still be subject to double 
taxation (FICA and income tax) does seem to constitute a gross 
inequity. An editorial in one of the nation’s largest newspapers 
labeled this the “most serious inequity of social security” and sum­
marized the widely held popular notion of social security as follows:
Americans perceive social security, for which large sums are extracted 
from their paychecks, as the nation’s primary pension plan. They see 
it as something they have earned, not as charity. They feel that their 
earnings after retirement should not impair their vested interest in 
that pension plan.
If our primary recommendation were adopted and benefits 
were truly based on contributions, the notion expressed above 
would be accurate, and there should be no earnings offset against 
those benefits. This is another problem of social security that is 
compounded by the fact that substantial welfare has been incor­
porated into the social security retirement system. Under our pres­
31
ent arrangement, which combines earned benefits with welfare, 
it is unfair to reduce the earned benefits at any level of income 
and unfair to continue the welfare benefits for those with substantial 
incomes from any source—earnings or investments.
Even with today’s mixed bag, it would be possible at the time 
each individual reaches social security retirement age to compute 
the price-level-adjusted total contributions by and for that indi­
vidual. Also, the pension justified by that total contribution figure 
could be calculated. Earnings after retirement should never reduce 
this earned retirement income. However, social security benefits 
above this amount (really welfare) should be offset by both earnings 
and investment income.
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APPENDIX
Price-Ievel-Adjusted Total Contributions
The following examples show the computation of the total contri­
butions from which to calculate monthly retirement benefits for any given 
individual under various lengths of working lifetimes and various inflation 
rates. In each case, it is assumed that both the employee and the employer 
contribute $700 annually to the system and that these amounts earn a
Example 1
Years of work 
Inflation rate 
Real rate of return 
Total
Future value of annuity 
of $1 at 3%
Annual employee 
retirement 
contribution
Equal amount for 
employer’s 
contribution
Base from which to 
calculate retirement 
benefits (price-level- 
adjusted total 
contributions)
10 20 30 40
-0- -0- -0- -0-
3% 3% 3% 3%
3% 3% 3% 3%
$11.46388 $26.87037 $47.57542 $75.40126
700 700 700 700
$ 8,025 $ 18,809 $ 33,303 $ 52,781
8,025 18,809 33,303 52,781
$ 16,050 $ 37,618 $ 66,606 $ 105,562
Example 2
Years of work 
Inflation rate 
Real rate of return
10
7%
3
20
7%
3
30
7%
3
40
7%
3
Total 10% 10% 10% 10%
Future value of an 
annuity of $1 at 10% $15.93742 $57.27500 $164.4940 $442.5926
Combined annual 
employee/employer 
retirement 
contribution 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400
Base from which to 
calculate retirement 
benefits $ 22,312 $ 80,185 $ 230,292 $ 619,630
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real rate of return of 3 percent. These examples are intentionally over­
simplified in that they are based on a constant annual contribution and 
on uniform rates of inflation.
Because it is progressively more difficult to retain a real rate of return 
as inflation increases, we recommend a one-tenth reduction in the real 
rate of return (.3 percent) for every full percentage point of inflation up 
to 10 percent. Thus, with inflation rates at 10 percent or above, there 
would be a zero real rate of return. Reworking example 2 under this 
assumption produces the following results.
Years of work 10 20 30 40
Inflation rate 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0%
Real rate of return 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Adjustment to real rate 
of return -2 .1 -2 .1 -2 .1 -2 .1
Total 7.9% 7.9% 7.9% 7.9%
Rounded to 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0%
Future value of an 
annuity of $1 at 8% $14.48656 $45.76196 $113.2832 $259.0565
Combined annual 
employee/employer 
retirement 
contribution 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400
Base from which to 
calculate retirement 
benefits $ 20,281 $ 64,067 $ 158,596 $ 362,679
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